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Abstract: Some contemporary scientists are using comparative neurobiological data to argue 
that non-mammalian vertebrates have feelings, most notably of pain (e.g., Braithwaite, 2010; 
Mashour and Alkire, 2012), while Key (2016) uses the same general data to reach the opposite 
conclusion. In a nutshell, he argues that fish cannot feel pain because fish don’t have a 
neocortex, which humans need to consciously experience pain. I don’t know how these scientists 
can look at essentially the same data and reach such disparate conclusions, but I suspect that 
some of them have strong a priori beliefs and, therefore, view the data through differently tinted 
spectacles. In any case, I think that both sides have overplayed their hands; the debate cannot be 
settled yet.  
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As Key (2016) notes in his review, teleost fish have brains that differ radically from those of 
mammals, especially in the forebrain. Teleost fish do have homologs of the main telencephalic 
divisions that all vertebrates share, but teleosts and other non-mammalian vertebrates don’t 
have the kind of laminated neocortex that mammals possess. Key also claims that humans with 
extensive damage to the neocortex lack consciousness, including feelings of pain. I am less 
certain of this claim, in part because the neocortex is such a prominent component of human 
brains that its destruction is likely to throw most of the remaining central nervous system into 
paralytic disarray (see Merker, 2007, for additional criticisms of the “consciousness is in the 
neocortex” argument and Långsjö et al., 2012, for some relevant data). However, for the 
purposes of argument, I am willing to grant that humans with total neocortical lesions tend not 
to feel pain. But do these stipulated facts allow us to conclude that fish cannot be conscious or 
feel pain? I do not think so, because fish might have evolved an altogether different set of 
neural circuits that is just as capable as the mammalian neocortex of generating consciousness. 
 
After all, the independent evolution of similar neural features and behavioral capacities is a 
well-known aspect of evolution. It is pretty clear, for example, that the capacity for complex 
cognition (e.g., tool manufacture and use) evolved independently in birds and mammals (see 
Striedter, 2013), even though the avian telencephalon is very different from its mammalian 
counterpart. (Birds do have a neocortex homolog, but most of it differs in numerous respects 
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from the mammalian neocortex.) Hence we cannot conclude that birds are incapable of complex 
cognition just because they lack a typical mammalian neocortex. Similarly, we cannot conclude 
that fish are red-green color blind just because they lack one of the photosensitive pigments 
that primates need to make this discrimination; fish simply accomplish this task using a different 
set of molecules (e.g., Bowmaker, 1998). In short, the fact that different species can (and did) 
evolve different neural mechanisms to achieve similar behaviors makes me wary of concluding 
that fish cannot feel pain simply because they lack mammalian neocortex. 
  
Key goes on to make a more specific and interesting argument: He claims that having a 
neocortex is the only way to achieve consciousness, because only a neocortex can provide the 
kind of “signal amplification” and “global integration” that is needed for consciousness. This is a 
laudable attempt to specify the kinds of “computations” that might be capable of generating 
consciousness. However, the criteria he lists seem vague to me and heavily dependent on the 
assumption that only a mammalian neocortex can generate consciousness, which would make 
the argument circular. Moreover, it is far from clear that fish brains cannot meet Key’s criteria, 
because some teleosts have a very well developed telencephalon (Nieuwenhuys, 2009), 
including lamination in some areas, and all teleosts have a large and highly laminated midbrain 
tectum, which is generally acknowledged to mediate multisensory and sensorimotor integration 
(Northmore, 2011), as well as attention (at least in mammals). So, who is to say that a fish brain 
cannot achieve the kind of signal amplification and global integration that is supposedly 
sufficient for generating conscious experiences? 
 
Key might counter that possession of a large midbrain is not relevant to the debate, because we 
already know (or have at least stipulated) that when the neocortex is lesioned in humans the 
remaining subcortical regions cannot support consciousness. However, ever since Richard Owen 
introduced the concept of homology into biology, it has been clear that homologous structures 
may change their functions during the course of evolution (e.g., Striedter and Northcutt, 1991). 
It is particularly relevant that non-mammals with lesions of the “cerebral hemispheres” have 
long been known to be capable of broadly conserved behaviors that primates with equivalent 
lesions cannot perform. For example, fish and frogs are capable of locomotion even after their 
telencephalon is ablated, whereas primates with lesions of the motor cortex are generally 
paralyzed (Ch. 2 of James, 1890). Given such species differences in lesion effects, I ask: if fish 
with without cerebral hemispheres can swim, why shouldn’t they be able to feel pain? It is at 
least a possibility. 
 
I am also concerned with Key’s claim that non-mammalian vertebrates “do not perform 
behaviours to be rewarded with pleasurable feelings or alternatively to escape painful feelings.”   
This claim seems to imply that non-mammals can only generate hard-wired defensive responses 
to noxious stimuli (nocifensive behaviors), and that they are incapable of behavior that is driven 
by expected rewards or punishments. Yet it is abundantly clear that both classical and 
instrumental conditioning are broadly conserved among the vertebrates (MacPhail, 1982). It is 
interesting to note, for example, that goldfish learn to avoid food that made them nauseous and 
that this conditioned taste aversion is impaired after telencephalic lesions, just as it is in 
mammals and birds. Based on his target article, I suspect that Key might respond by saying that 
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such forms of learning have “survival value” and are, therefore, distinct from conscious feelings. 
However, I am not convinced that conscious feelings must lack survival value to be considered 
genuine. Indeed, I would argue that a generalized “feeling of pain” might be just as useful to 
animals as a highly localized sensation of pain; the latter helps the animal deal with present 
pain, the former helps it learn how to avoid future pain.   
 
For me, there are two key unanswered questions: First, how does neural circuitry generate 
consciousness? If we could answer this question, then we could perhaps determine which 
species have the requisite mechanisms, be they in the neocortex or elsewhere. Alas, I remain 
unconvinced of any answers that have thus far been proposed. Second, I would like to know 
what “selective pressures” might give rise to feelings and consciousness, and whether those 
pressures might differ across species? Again, I do not have a clear answer, but it seems clear to 
me that pain may have a variety of functions in addition to simply triggering an escape from 
noxious stimuli. Feelings and memories of pain might, for example, prompt an injured animal to 
rest and heal, long after the noxious stimulus has passed. Importantly, I’m happy to concede 
that these functions may vary across species. I am intrigued, for example, by the recent 
suggestion that humans might feel and express pain differently from other animals, because 
humans stand to benefit (much more than other animals) when their conspecifics help them 
recuperate (Finlay and Syal, 2014). However, allowing for this species difference need not imply 
that non-humans do not feel pain; it simply means that they might feel it differently and, just as 
importantly, express those feelings differently.  
 
In short, I think that it is possible to analyze feelings of pain (perhaps even consciousness in 
general) from a comparative perspective, but drawing firm conclusions now seems premature. 
Hopefully some data from comparative neurobiology can help inform this quest, but I am not 
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